It’s generally assumed that copies of the encryption key have been left with Wikileaks supporters who will, in the appropriate contingency like Assange being assassinated, leak the key online to the thousands of downloaders of the insurance file, who will then read and publicize whatever contents as in it (speculated to be additional US documents Manning gave Wikileaks) this way, if the worst happens and Wikileaks cannot afford to keep digesting the files to eventually release them at its leisure in the way it calculates will have the most impact, the files will still be released and someone will be very unhappy.
Julian Assange & Wikileaks made headlines in 2010 when they released an “insurance file”, an 1.4GB AES-256-encrypted file available through BitTorrent. Finally, I cover obfuscation & witness-encryption which, combined with proof-of-work, can be said to solve time-lock crypto but currently remain infeasible. I suggest a new time-lock crypto based on chained hashes hashes have been heavily attacked for other purposes, and may be safer than number-squaring.
Onenote sidenotes 2015 serial#
A better time-lock crypto proposal replaces trusted-third-parties with forcibly serial proof-of-work using number squaring and guaranteeing unlocking not after a certain point in time but after sufficient computation-time has been spent it’s unclear how well number-squaring resists optimization or shortcuts. Proposals often resort to trusted-third-parties, which are vulnerabilities. I survey techniques for time-lock crypto. It is not so easy to achieve adjustable decryptability over time, a “time-lock crypto”: for some uses (data escrow, leaking, insurance, last-resort Bitcoin backups etc), one wants data which is distributed only after a certain point in time. In cryptography, it is easy to adjust encryption of data so that one, some, or all people can decrypt it, or some combination thereof.
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